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Abstract: For over twenty-five years, the Reference Monitor Concept [1] has proved
itself to be a useful tool for computer security practitioners.  It can also be used
as a conceptual tool in computer security education. This paper describes a
computer security education program at the Naval Postgraduate School that
has used the Reference Monitor concept as a unifying principle for courses,
laboratory work, and student research.  The intent of the program is to produce
graduates who will think critically about the design and implementation of
systems intended to enforce security policies.
1. INTRODUCTION
Since its 1972 introduction in the “Anderson Report” [1], the Reference
Monitor Concept has served the computer and network security communities
in two ways.  First it provides an abstract model of the necessary and
sufficient properties that must be achieved by any system claiming to
securely enforce access controls.  Second, it has been a tool used in the
design and implementation of secure automated systems.
As an abstraction, the Reference Monitor Concept does not refer to any
particular policy to be enforced by a system, nor does it address any
particular implementation.  It is up to organisations to articulate the former
as a part of the requirements for their computer systems [23]; the Reference
Monitor Concept does not judge whether a policy is appropriate.
Instantiations of the Reference Monitor Concept can vary from “monolithic”
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systems to complex networks. The abstract notion is intended to, and can,
encompass all systems required to enforce some access control policy. A
particular instantiation of the Reference Monitor Concept will enforce a
particular policy.
This paper describes a computer security education program at the Naval
Postgraduate School that has used the Reference Monitor concept as a
unifying principle for courses, laboratory work, and student research.  The
intent of the program is to produce graduates who will think critically about
the design and implementation of systems intended to enforce security
policies. In Section 2 the Reference Monitor Concept will be reviewed.
Section 3 will provide and overview of the roles that NPS graduates will
play in the architectural plans and construction of secure systems.  The
computer security program and how the Reference Monitor Concept is used
as a pedagogical tool will be discussed in Section 4. A summary follows in
Section 5.
2. REFERENCE MONITOR CONCEPT
What elements of the Reference Monitor Concept make it a powerful tool
for analysing system security properties?
– First, it states that the access mediation mechanism is always invoked—
every access is mediated.  If this were not the case, then it would be
possible for an entity to bypass the mechanism and violate the policy that
must be enforced.
– Second, the access mediation mechanism is tamperproof. In the model, it
is impossible for a penetrator to attack the access mediation mechanism
such that the required access checks are not performed and authorizations
not enforced.
– Third it "must be small enough to be subject to analysis and tests, the
completeness of which can be assured” [1]. This must be the case, since
if the mechanism could be demonstrated to be flawed, then it would not
enforce the policy.
To date, the Reference Monitor Concept is the only effective tool we
know of for describing the abstract requirements of secure system design and
implementation.  No viable alternative has been introduced and it has proven
itself effective under close scrutiny1. Even if there were no demand for well
engineered secure systems, should students learn about the Reference
1 In 1997, the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy held a debate concerning the
effectiveness of the Reference Monitor Concept in modern system development
environments. The contest was won, by a large margin by those claiming that this
abstraction continues to be an effective model for secure systems [15, 3, 20].
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Monitor Concept? The answer is simple. It is a paradigm that we know
works.
Is an educational program based upon the Reference Monitor Concept
relevant? One might argue that market factors in computing today indicate
that this model is no longer applicable. Some would ask: “The Reference
Monitor Concept was introduced twenty-five years ago. If systems could be
more secure by applying that paradigm, then why don't such secure systems
exist?” Two factors contribute to the current situation.  They are a
combination of customer ignorance and management dictates that do not
permit engineers to construct systems as well as they could. Customers who
do not know better will accept insecure solutions. Given no market demand
for security and business profit motives, management will not allocate
corporate resources to engineer systems with better security. Clearly a
decision not to construct sound secure systems does not mean that engineers
do not know how to build them!
It might also be argued that political processes may make engineering of
systems based upon the Reference Monitor Concept difficult. Scientists and
engineers must recognize that their work is conducted within a political
context [5]. Often negotiations are required and a variety of factors can
impact the outcome of a project.
Several arguments favor the use of the Reference Monitor Concept as a
teaching construct.  First, using the Reference Monitor Concept, students
will understand how a sound system could be built and can better analyse the
impact of competing requirements. Second, it provides a framework for
teaching a rigorous, analytical approach to systems that draws from many
disciplines: programming languages, software engineering, operating
systems, networks, etc. Third, it is a model that is applicable across a broad
range of systems and guides students' creative processes when considering
new systems.
3. UNIVERSITY CONTEXT
The Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) is a graduate university operated
by the United States Navy. It grants MS and PhD degrees in a variety of
engineering disciplines including computer science, physics, meteorology,
oceanography, mathematics, engineering, and operations research. Most
students receive MS degrees. The student population is comprised of U.S.
military officers, Department of Defense and U.S. Government civilians, and
officers from allied military services. The majority of the students have had
from five to ten years of military experience since receiving their BA or BS
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degrees.  Many enter NPS graduate degree programs based upon aptitude
rather than a prior degree in the field.  Thus, the MS programs include both
the courses and additional time required to compensate for a lack of
undergraduate background. In Computer Science, the MS degree curriculum
takes two years.  In addition to courses, the degree requirement for an MS at
NPS includes a thesis.
Graduates continue their careers as military officers. Although some
computer science graduates apply their educat ons in the detailed design and
implementation of systems, more often than not they participate in systems-
level programs in a managerial capacity. Contractors and DoD civilians
often provide the detailed engineering and programming.  Among an
officer's responsibilities may fall determination of whether or not a system
meets DoD requirements. These may include security, fault tolerance, and a
variety of performance and operational characteristics.  An asset for
graduates is the ability to apply their scientific and engineering knowledge to
new problem areas while contributing to the soundness of solutions.
4. SECURITY PROGRAM
The Naval Postgraduate School computer security program [9] is
intended to address the needs of a variety of students.  All students enrolled
in the Computer Science, Information Warfare, Command and Control, and
Information Technology Curricula are required to take a survey course in
computer security. Many also enr ll in a course, entitled “Secure
Management of Systems,” intended to address practical aspects of computer
security such as certification, accreditation, risk analysis, and configuration
management. Advanced courses are available for students who wish to
pursue computer security as a speci lization area.  These courses include:





In the subsections that follow the use of the Reference Monitor Concept
as a unifying notion for a security education program will be described.
Included will be studies that preceded the articulation of the Reference
Monitor Concept, its formulation, and techniques to create instances of the
Reference Monitor Concept.
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4.1 The Dangers of Penetrate and Patch
Prior to formulating the Reference Monitor Concept the team tasked with
producing the Air Force report spent considerable time reviewing existing
methods for securing computers.  They found that ad hoc approaches to
computer security were common.
In an introductory security course, students are often motivated through
presentations of various system vulnerabilities and threats. An appendix to
the Anderson Report provides a review of attacks, giving generic categories
of attacks as well as specific examples where each of the attacks had be
successfully mounted against an existing system. It described the activities
of tiger teams engaged in games of penetrate and patch with vendors. The
tiger team would exploit a system flaw and inform the vendor of the flaw.
The vendor's repairs usually introduced additional flaws that were quickly
exploited by the tiger teams. The conclusion of this analysis was that
systems not abinitio designed to be secure, could never be repaired in such a
way that users would be confident of system security.
A discussion of contemporary problems with comparisons to those
encountered several decades ago illustrates the fact that by ignoring the
Reference Monitor Concept, the situation in computer security is little
improved over that of 1972.
The problem of malicious code is discussed.  This includes not only
viruses and malicious macros, but looks forward to code to be used in
distributed, web-based systems.  The confinement of executables to well-
defined domains and analysis of code dependencies are addressed. The
Anderson Report specifically addressed executable software. Users of Air
Force systems were to be permitted to develop and execute their own
software. This can be construed to include the loading of software developed
elsewhere as well. Thus, there was potential for users to either accidentally
or intentionally load malicious software. These issues illustrate the
importance of a mechanism that is always invoked and that cannot be altered
without authorization.
In addition, students discuss the problem of system subversion—the
intentional insertion of an artifice at some point during a system's lifecycle
[16]. Here the notion of assurance of correctness can be introduced.  Any
number of “Easter eggs” can be used to illustrate subversion of popular
commercial products.
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4.2 Passwords, Audit, Intrusion Detection
With the Reference Monitor Concept as the model for a system's central
policy enforcement mechanism, students are introduced to supporting
policies and instantiations of those policies.  These include Identification and
Authentication, and Audit.
From the Reference Monitor Concept perspective, Identification and
Authentication provides the binding of a user's identity to active system
entities executing on his or her behalf. Starting with identification and
authentication in monolithic systems, discussions are extended to
authentication in networks and single-sig on support systems.
The notion of accountability is introduced and extended in discussions of
audit.  It is applicable regardless of the access control policy to be enforced.
Students examine password criteria, password and account administration,
and the implementation of trusted paths.  The last can be illustrated with the
Windows NT trusted path, which requires the use of a “secure attention
key.”
Audit is an essential component in an accountability scheme. Students
can examine traditional audit mechanisms and then expand to intrusion
detection systems. An important challenge to be discussed is protection of
the audit mechanism, the audit trail, and audit reduction tools. For
distributed intrusion detection systems, discussions of the Reference Monitor
Concept as applied to a network are pertinent.
4.3 Security Policy
The Reference Monitor Concept is policy neutral, however, in real
systems policies are enforced.
One of the most significant problems facing many system developers is
extracting a statement of organizational security policy from those who will
own and operate the system. Too often a system requirement is stated as
“security” and no more. This is meaningless. The computer scientist must
ask: “You want security with respect to what?” Generally this is translated
into statements regarding access to information by individuals for the
purposes of disclosure and modification. This high level statement of policy
may also include notions of availability. Availability as a security objective
is subjective and students need to understand this.
A challenge is to understand whether the policy to be enforced makes
sense and whether it is enforced correctly.  Security models permit us to
understand the former and provide a mathematical articulation of policy to
which system implementations can be mapped for the purposes of
verification.
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Fortunately, military o ganizations have well articulated secrecy policies
for information of various sensitivity levels. This permits us to examine
these policies and determine how they can be expressed as technical policies
in formal models. Considerable research has been conducted in the area
formal models, for example [2, 4, 15].  Broad classes of policies are
introduced to students: discretionary, information flow, work flow, etc.
Beginning courses provide an overview of policies and models, while
students in advanced courses study selected models in detail. By reading
seminal papers, they explore the theoretical foundations of access control
and complete laboratory exercises to prove the Basic Security Theorem and
simple mandatory and discretionary models. At NPS,  PVS [19] is used to
introduce students to mechanical theorem proving techniques.
4.4 Secure System Construction
As a study topic, building secure systems allows students to learn about
techniques that are applicable to the realization of Reference Monitor
Concept objectives.
Students study classic papers such as that of Saltzer and Schroeder [4].
They continue by examining how classic concepts are (or are not) applied in
modern systems such as Windows NT.  In case studies and hands-on
experiments, students test their understanding of protection mechanisms.
To implement a system in which every access to information is mediated
by the reference monitor, system designers must determine which aspects of
the system will be available directly and which will be virtualiz d.
Virtualization provides a way to insert the reference validation mechanism
between system resources and active entities. By examining both software
and hardware, students examine hardware platforms and learn that some
provide significant support for address space isolation [8, 18, 22], while if
other platforms are used, the system developer must construct such isolation
mechanisms in software. Students learn how hardware resources can be
virtualized so that access checks can be applied [6, 12, 24]. The use of
hardware mechanisms to construct isolated address spaces that provide for
self protection of a reference validation mechanism and separation of
application-level entities is examined. Software to utilize and extend those
facilities is discussed.
The Reference Monitor Concept is an ideal; real systems are imperfect.
Students explore covert channels and the relationship between assurance and
the system development lifecycle.  They learn the importance of software
engineering techniques as applied to the creation of Reference Monitor
Concept instances.
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4.5 Network Security
The NPS program includes network security in its introductory as well as
an advanced course on network security. Both encompass a wide variety of
topics including cryptography, protocols, public key technology, IP-security,
virtual private networks, secure mail, web security, etc. Evolving standards
and technologies permit (or force) classroom presentations in network
security to be refreshed frequently. Yet, the underlying principles have
already been established. The full power of the Reference Monitor Concept
can be recognized in these distributed contexts.
A physical network may support a logical system, i.e. a virtual network.
Some policy will be applicable to that network. The standard requirements
apply: the policy enforcement mechanism must always be invoked, must be
tamperproof, and it must be correct.  Students can discuss how end systems,
intermediate nodes, cryptographic mechanisms, and protocols combine to
support a distributed policy enforcement mechanism. They can examine how
reference monitor instantiations at end systems interact across a network.
Each individual reference monitor must have predefined or negotiated
cryptography and protocols necessary to ensure its s lf p otection as well as
satisfy the requirements for communication with the remote system.  The use
of virtual private networks to isolate different user groups and the use of
mechanisms to protect hosts against tampering places the concepts of secure
system design and implementation at the center of network security.
4.6 Database Security
Database security illustrates the application of the Reference Monitor
Concept to massive systems with complex security policies.  Several case
studies, such as SeaView [13], allow advanced students to understand that
highly trusted secure systems can be constructed. Students learn how the
concept of TCB subsets [21] can be applied in systems that enforce a
hierarchy of security policies.
As an aside, it is noteworthy that there are database topics that currently
do not fit into our Reference Monitor Concept framework.  Statistical
database security, inference and aggregation are among the topics covered in
the database security course that fall outside of the framework of our
unifying notion.  They are, however, quite important, particularly for privacy
concerns in an era of increased use of knowledge bases and data mining.
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4.7 System Evaluation and Management
Critical military systems are subjected to a certification and accreditation
process.  A study of these processes permits students to examine the criteria
and methods used to evaluate the effectiveness of reference monitor
instances.  They learn the cost of high assurance and some reasonable
compromises that can be made with respect to assurance and policies. For
example, they learn that a mechanism for enforcement of a weak policy [7]
may not merit the extraordinary efforts one might invest in the assurance of a
system intended to enforce a critical access control policy.
Configuration management and system administration play an important
part in system lifecycle assurance.  In both introductory and advanced
courses students are exposed to these topics.  The advanced course allows
students to configure and use a variety of contemporary tools for monitoring
and maintaining system health.  To ensure that student experiments do not
escape from the laboratory and corrupt campus networks, a small, isolated
network is used for security tests.
The Reference Monitor Concept and assurance is discussed in the context
of legal issues. As connectivity and dependence upon computers expands,
the possibility of computer accidents and subsequent litigation will increase.
For example if a system has no assurance of correctness of policy
enforcement or penetration resistance, can a user be held accountable for
actions of malicious software?
4.8 Thesis Research
Thesis research permits students to apply what they have learned in class
to current problems.  Certain research projects lend themselves to the direct
application of the reference monitor concept [10, 11]. Often students are
involved research projects involving applications or m ddleware [25]. In
these projects, they learn how dependencies on underlying security
mechanisms affect the assurance arguments that can be made for their
system. They learn how to implement the reference monitor concept within a
TCB subset [21] and how notions of a distributed reference monitor [17] can
be applied.  In application and mid leware efforts that rely upon weakly
secure commercial products, students learn the limitations of the underlying
systems and are better able to appreciate the value of coherent security
architectures.
The thesis program allows students to work with both NPS faculty and
staff on current research topics. In addition, students address topics of
interest to Department of Defense and U.S. Government sponsors. Thesis
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supervision may be collaborative, involving outside experts from
government and industry as advisors. These external contributors enrich the
educational program and help students to examine the Reference Monitor
Concept across a broad range of emerging areas.
5. SUMMARY
For over twenty-five years, the Reference Monitor Concept has proved
itself to be a useful tool for computer security practitioners.  It can also be
used as a conceptual tool for constructing a computer security education
program.  The computer security program at the Naval Postgraduate School
is intended to prepare military officers to participate in the design and
implementation of future systems. By introducing students to the Reference
Monitor Concept and subsequently describing how it can be realized,
graduates are equipped with an essential tool for constructing and assessing
the effectiveness and assurance of security policy enforcement in automated
systems.
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